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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KEVIN R. BLANKE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040134-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Blanke was deprived of effective assistance of counsel during the 
hearing for motion to withdraw guilty plea? "Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are 
reviewed on appeal as a matter of law." State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348,1 15, 57 P.3d 
1139. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
1 
Kevin R. Blanke appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Third District Court after being convicted of kidnapping, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Kevin R. Blanke was charged by information filed in the Third Judicial District 
Court on or about September 5, 2002, with aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-302 (R. 2-3). 
Michael A. Peterson entered his appearance of counsel in behalf of Blanke on 
September 10, 2002 (R. 16). 
On October 17, 2002, Blanke filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting that the four 
year statute of limitations had run prior to the time the State filed this action (R. 25-32). 
The State filed its opposition to the motion on December 13, 2002, contending that in 
2002, the Utah Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-301 on May 6, 2002, which 
allowed the State to commence prosecution for aggravated kidnapping at any time (R. 54-
60). 
On January 24, 2003, a hearing was held regarding the Motion to Dismiss (R. 
142). The trial court denied the motion on February 5,2003 (R. 77). 
On September 12, 2003, Blanke entered a plea of guilty to kidnapping, a second 
degree felony (R. 86-93, 140). 
On November 6,2003, Blanke filed pro se a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 
contending his court appointed attorney misled him into believing he could appeal the 
statute of limitations issue and that his attorney told him there was DNA evidence against 
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him when in fact there was none (R. 100-101). Blanke also asserted that a prison contract 
attorney incorrectly told him that any appeal would be frivolous since he plead guilty. 
Blanke further asserted that his plea was made under duress due to significant pain he 
suffered from ostio arthritis (R. 101). 
On December 6,2003, Blanke filed pro se a Motion to Enlarge, requesting the trial 
court to enlarge the 30-day appeal period (R. 102). 
On January 7, 2004, the Hearing regarding Blanke's Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea was held (R. 146). Blanke was represented by Julie George. The trial court 
ultimately denied the motion (R. 146: 30-31). 
On February 2, 2004, Blanke was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 111). 
On February 4, 2004, the trial court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order on the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw His Guilty Plea (R. 116). The Court 
found that the motion was timely pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) since 
sentencing had not yet been pronounced, but held that Blanke "failed to present any 
evidence or proof that his defense attorney, Mr. Peterson, had ' duped' him or that his plea 
was involuntary." 
On February 9, 2004, Blanke filed his Notice of Appeal from the judgment, 
sentence, and commitment in this case (R. 122). An Amended Notice of Appeal was 
filed on March 2, 2004 (R. 128). 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
At Blanke's motion to withdraw plea hearing, Blanke's defense counsel, Julie 
George, stated that Blanke had prepared and given him an affidavit of facts regarding the 
reasons for withdrawing the guilty plea, but George failed to submit the affidavit into 
evidence (R. 146: 9-10). According to the record, the affidavit explained that Mr. 
Peterson, Blanke's original defense counsel, told Blanke on or about September 15, 2003, 
that he could appeal the case within 30 days after sentencing on the basis of the statute of 
limitation issue (R. 146: 10). Mr. Peterson also told Blanke that there was DNA evidence 
against him, in effect lying to Blanke and duping him into taking a plea against his best 
interests (R. 146: 10). In fact, there was no DNA evidence against Blanke; the Prosecutor 
stated explicitly that while "it appears to me that they did find some hair and some fibers 
from the crime scene... they don't show any record of those items having been tested" 
(R. 146: 28). 
George also read part of a letter from Peterson to Blanke dated November 13, 
2003, wherein Peterson told Blanke: "Pursuant to our phone conversation of October 29, 
I informed you that your only realistic chance of preserving the statute of limitations 
issue for appellate review is to file an immediate motion to withdraw your guilty plea. If 
you do not withdraw your plea, the State and Federal appellate courts will rule that you 
waive the statute of limitations argument and appeal when you entered your rule rather 
than plead before Judge Reese" (R. 146: 29). 
George never attempted to have Blanke sworn in to testify regarding his reasons 
for moving to withdraw the guilty plea, nor did George present any evidence before the 
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trial court regarding Blanke's reasons for withdrawing the plea, even though Blanke was 
present at the hearing and had presented George with an affidavit (R. 146). 
After George's proffer, the trial court ruled: 
[G]etting to the merits of the argument that Mr. Blanke makes, that he 
should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because his attorney lied to him 
about the quality of the evidence. I'm going to deny the motion, Mr. Blanke, and 
find that the defendant just simply hasn't provided any evidence of that at all 
today. 
Number one, the - the request that Mr. Blanke filed is not verified in any 
way. It's just simply a letter signed by him that has several grounds listed for 
withdrawing the plea. 
Number two, there had been no affidavit filed by Mr. Peterson, admitting 
that he made this mistake. There's been no sworn testimony from Mr. Blanke or 
Mr. Peterson, no opportunity to provide that evidence requested. 
Just - my conclusion here today would be just simply that Mr. Blanke has 
made his allegation, it's nothing today more than an allegation, it's not been 
proven in any way, there's been no evidence offered to prove it. And in my 
judgment, at least, there's no merit to it, so I'm going to deny Mr. Blanke's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea. 
(R. 146:31). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Blanke asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his hearing for 
motion to withdraw guilty plea. The record clearly indicates that Blanke was present at 
the hearing and ready and willing to testify and that he provided trial counsel an affidavit 
concerning the basis for the withdrawal of his plea. However, trial counsel failed to 
admit into the record any evidence regarding prior trial counsel's misrepresentations to 
Blanke concerning the weight of DNA evidence and the ability to file an appeal on the 
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statute of limitations issue. Because trial counsel admitted no evidence into the record, 
the trial court summarily found that Blanke had not carried his burden of proof. 
The record further indicates that Blanke was duped by his original trial counsel 
into believing that the State had damning DNA evidence against him and that he would 
be able to appeal the statute of limitations issue before this Court. Blanke asserts that 
these misrepresentations led him to enter a plea of guilty that was not knowing and 
voluntary. Had trial counsel presented this evidence before the trial court at the hearing, 
the trial court would have granted Blanke's motion and ordered his plea withdrawn. 
Accordingly, this Court should remand this matter for a new hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BLANKE WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO COMPETENT COUNSEL 
AT THE HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY 
PLEA BECAUSE HIS ATTORNEY FAILED TO ADMIT ANY 
EVIDENCE REGARDING WHETHER BLANKE'S PLEA WAS 
MADE INTELLIGENTLY AND KNOWINGLY 
Blanke timely moved to withdraw his guilty plea and the trial court held a motion 
hearing to consider whether good cause was shown to withdraw the plea on January 7, 
2004 (R. 146: 30). However, the trial court denied the motion after trial counsel, Julie 
George, failed to present any evidence as to whether the plea was not made intelligently 
and knowingly (R. 146: 30-31). Blanke asserts that George was ineffective for failing to 
present any evidence regarding his original defense counsel's misrepresentations 
regarding his ability to appeal the plea and misrepresentations regarding DNA evidence. 
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Blank asserts that these misrepresentations caused his plea to be not knowing and 
voluntary, without which he would not have entered a plea of guilty (R. 100-101). But 
for counsel's ineffectiveness, the trial court would have granted Blanke's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, this matter should be remanded to the trial court 
to conduct a new hearing on the motion to withdraw guilty plea. 
"Under the Stricklandtest, an individual has been denied the effective assistance 
of counsel if: (1) counsel's performance was deficient below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment, and (2) counsel's performance prejudiced the 
defendant." State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12,116, 26 P.3d 203; (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). 
In State v. Ison, 2004 UT App 252, 96 P.3d 374, defendant, owner of a travel 
agency, appealed from a conviction of two counts of communications fraud, claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at If 1. The charges were based on defendant's 
alleged misrepresentations to clients regarding moneys paid for a cruise. Id. at fflps 2-9. 
A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to determine whether 
defendant had made misrepresentations to clients regarding the cruise. Id. at f 9. The 
ALJ concluded that defendant had committed no statutory violations. Id. During trial, 
counsel failed to admit the ALJ's findings that defendant "made no misrepresentations to 
any passenger" and never "assume[d] responsibility for the cruise and tour bookings in 
question." Id. at ^ 15. 
This Court found that "[tjrial counsel was aware of the ALJ decision," that the 
evidence "would have helped exonerate Defendant," and that "there was no strategic 
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reason for not moving for its admission." Ison, 2004 UT App 252 at ^ 19. Based on the 
nature of the evidence, the Court held that trial counsel's failure to move to admit the 
ALJ's decision amounted to an omission that fell 'below the standard of reasonable 
professional assistance."/d. (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993)). 
The Court further concluded that defendant was prejudiced by this omission and reversed 
and remanded for a new trial. Id. fflf's 19, 23. 
In State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203, 73 P.3d 967, defendant, a Mexican 
citizen, enter a plea of guilty to one count of sexual battery. Id. at f 2. At the plea 
hearing, the trial court found that defendant's counsel "informed [him] that his guilty plea 
and conviction could lead to deportation, but it might or might not." Id. The trial court 
then advised defendant of his various rights under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, after which defendant waived his rights and pleaded guilty. Id. at \ 3. 
Defendant timely moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that his counsel 
was ineffective for misrepresenting the law regarding the deportation consequences of his 
plea. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203 at fflf 4, 6. The trial court denied the motion, 
finding defendant's counsel "did not affirmatively misrepresent the [deportation] 
consequences of... defendant's guilty plea." Id. at^ f 4. On appeal, defendant asserted 
that the trial court erred in finding his trial counsel afforded effective assistance of 
counsel and therefore erred in denying the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at [^ 5. 
This Court found that defendant's counsel "affirmatively misrepresented the 
consequences of Defendant's plea, and thus counsel's 'performance was deficient below 
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment."' Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT 
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App 203 at If 10 (quoting Martinez, 2001 UT 12 at ^ 16). This Court further found that 
counsel's ineffectiveness prejudiced defendant since he would not have pleaded guilty 
had he known he would be deported. Id. at f^ 11. This Court then concluded that "the trial 
court erred in ruling that Defendant was afforded effective assistance of counsel and 
therefore erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea." Id. 
Blanke asserts that his trial counsel, Julie George, was ineffective for failing to 
admit evidence that would have shown his plea was not knowing and voluntary. The 
facts and conclusion in Ison, wherein trial counsel was found ineffective for failing to 
admit exculpatory evidence, supports this position. As in Ison, George was ineffective 
for failing to admit any evidence regarding Blanke's basis for withdrawing his plea (R. 
146). George stated to the trial court that he had an affidavit jfirom Blanke explaining that 
prior trial counsel, Michael Peterson, had lied to him saying there was DNA evidence 
against him and that he could appeal the statute of limitations issue, but George failed to 
admit this affidavit into evidence (R. 146). The trial court specifically found against 
Blanke because "the request that Mr. Blanke filed is not verified in any way" and because 
George "just simply hasn't provided any evidence" of Mr. Peterson's misrepresentations 
(R. 146: 31). Not only did George fail to admit the affidavit to the trial court, but he 
failed to place Blanke on the stand to testify as to the basis of withdrawing his plea (R. 
146). Either action would have presented the trial court with sufficient evidence to 
conclude that Blanke's plea was unknowing and involuntary. 
Rojas-Martinez also provide support to Blanke's position that George afforded 
ineffective assistance of counsel. In Rojas-Martinez^ this Court held that trial counsel is 
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ineffective if he "affirmatively misreprent[s]" the consequences of a guilty plea. Rojas-
Martinez, 2003 UT App 203 at ^ f 10. In this case, Blanke asserts that Peterson told him 
that he could appeal the statute of limitations issue and enter a plea of guilty (R. 100-101; 
146: 9-11, 22, 29)1. George read from Blanke's affidavit confirming Peterson's 
assertions, and also read to the trial court a letter that Peterson wrote to Blanke, 
confirming that Blanke wanted to appeal the statute of limitations issue (R. 146: 9-11, 
29). However, George failed to admit either the affidavit or letter into evidence, and 
further failed to have Blanke testify to these matters (R. 146). 
Additionally, it stands to reason that trial counsel is also ineffective if he 
misrepresents the weight of the State's evidence, leading a defendant to enter a plea of 
guilty when he otherwise would not take a plea. Peterson told Blanke that there was 
DNA evidence against and advised him he should enter a plea of guilty (R. 100; 146: 10). 
This was simply untrue, as the prosecutor explained (R. 146: 28). Despite this fact, 
George failed to admit Blanke"s affidavit into evidence and failed to have Blanke testify 
as to what Peterson told him (R. 146). 
As a result of these misrepresentations, Blanke pleaded guilty (R. 100-101). 
George's failure to admit into evidence the basis for Blanke's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea, which was based on Peterson's misrepresentations, constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Had George admitted this evidence, the trial court would have 
found that Blanke's plea was not knowing and voluntary and therefore, would have 
1
 There is no record that Peterson attempted to obtain a Sery Plea in order to preserve the 
statute of limitations issue for appeal. See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). 
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granted the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Thus, George's performance fell below 
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and but for the deficient 
performance, Blanke's guilty plea would have been withdrawn. Therefore, this Court 
should remand this case for a new motion hearing. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Blanke asks this Court to reverse his conviction and 
remand this case to the trial court for a new hearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of October, 2004. 
Margarets. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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